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Do Firms Contribute to the Variation in Employees’ Performance in Knowledge-Intensive 
Industries? The Case of Equity Research 
Oded Rozenbaum 
Employee knowledge is a critical contributor to the quality of output in knowledge-intensive 
industries. A debated but unresolved question is whether the resources provided by firms in 
knowledge-intensive industries contribute to the observed variation in employees’ performance 
across firms. The answer to this question is unclear because the benefits from the resources that 
firms provide may be competed away or transferred to the employees when they leave the firm. I 
provide evidence on this question by analyzing the equity research industry. Specifically, I 
examine the change in forecast accuracy of sell-side analysts who move from one brokerage house 
to another while maintaining coverage of the same firms. This setting allows me to isolate the 
brokerage house effect on forecast accuracy since the analyst and task are held constant. I find that 
when an analyst moves to a brokerage house with more (less) resources, analyst forecast accuracy 
improves (deteriorates). These findings suggest that firms in at least one industry are able to 
acquire a competitive advantage and generate value by providing their employees with useful and 
unique resources that cannot be easily transferred when those employees move across firms. I 
further explore whether my results are driven by the endogeneity of analyst turnover by examining 
a subsample of turnovers that result from brokerage house closures. My results hold in this 
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Can employers in knowledge-intensive industries create economic value by investing in 
resources to enhance their employees’ output? Or are such investments competed away by rival 
firms or “lost” if employees are able to absorb those resources and transfer them to competing 
firms? While these questions are fundamental to the theory of the firm, the empirical evidence is 
sparse and inconclusive. 
It is difficult to evaluate these questions as they require identifying individuals’ 
performance and changes to the resource environment. As a result, prior endeavors to investigate 
these questions have clustered around a few industries such as academia (e.g., Dale and Krueger, 
2002; Kim et al., 2009; Azoulay et al., 2010; Waldinger, 2010; Waldinger, 2012; and Borjas and 
Doran, 2012), healthcare (e.g., Huckman and Pisano, 2006; and Contreras et al., 2011), education 
(e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; and Chetty et al., 2011) and research and development (e.g., Jaffe et al., 
1993; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; and Jain, 2013). Although the settings examined in prior literature 
have many merits, they possess many weaknesses as well. For example, the incentive structure in 
academia that promotes collaboration across academic institutions and the tenure concept may 
both affect the external validity of studies that examine this industry. Furthermore, the inability to 
attribute the exact contribution of a certain author to a paper and the failure to identify when a 
research project began limits the internal validity of those studies as well. 
This study attempts to overcome the limitations in prior studies by examining the sell-side 
equity research industry and the effect of brokerage house resources on analyst performance.1 
Specifically, I exploit a panel data set that contains the quarterly earnings forecasts made by 
                                                             
1 The definition of resources I refer to is broad, and includes peer-groups, tangible resources such as computing 




analysts for the firms they cover, the analyst names, the date of the forecast, and the name of the 
brokerage house they worked for at the time of the forecast. I then identify a subset of analysts that 
moved from one brokerage house to another but covered the same firms. In addition, I benchmark 
those analysts’ results relative to a consensus forecast that is based on other analysts that cover the 
same firm but did not move to a different brokerage house. 
I argue that the sell-side equity research industry is not only an important industry that has 
a great impact on capital markets, but also an industry that offers a unique setting to investigate 
those questions, as it overcomes many of the aforementioned weaknesses in prior studies. First, 
the task of the analyst remains the same, since I examine analysts who maintain coverage of the 
same firms following turnover. Second, I benchmark the analysts’ forecast accuracy relative to the 
consensus, which allows me to control for time varying task differences. Third, I test the change 
in an observable output that can be evaluated objectively (forecast accuracy).2 Fourth, relative to 
the publication process in academia, the time it takes to update a forecast is relatively short, so the 
concern that the work on a specific forecast was performed at two different brokerage houses is 
eliminated. Lastly, the sell-side equity research industry is highly competitive on multiple 
dimensions. The labor and product markets are highly competitive as equity research firms sell 
information, which travels fast and can be easily disseminated, and analyst turnover is a common 
practice in the sell-side equity research industry. Furthermore, brokerage houses are not just 
competing against each other in producing resources, but also against other data providers. 
                                                             
2 While earnings forecasts are not the analysts’ only task, as analysts are also required to communicate directly with 
clients, earnings forecasts have many appealing features. First, earnings forecasts embed the knowledge and insight 
the analyst has on the firm and are also the source for her recommendations and price targets (Loh and Mian, 2006). 
Second, earnings forecasts are the analysts’ outputs’ that are most frequently updated, which is advantageous given 
the relatively short period that I evaluate. In addition, examining quarterly earnings forecasts increases the power of 
the tests because there are multiple realizations in the evaluation period. Lastly, forecast accuracy is the analysts’ 




To illustrate this point, Barry Hurewitz (2013), former managing director and chief 
operating officer of equity research at Morgan Stanley, notes that the competitive advantage 
Morgan Stanley gained from the use of satellites to track ships in order to gauge international trade 
flows was eventually competed away. He states: “Today, some of this information is available 
inside Bloomberg or in a Thomson Reuter terminal. You can actually watch ships moving around.” 
He further states: “...when an analyst leaves, historically they took everything with them.” The 
main question addressed in this paper is whether brokerage houses contribute to their analysts’ 
forecast accuracy through the unique resources they provide and whether the analyst can absorb 
and transfer those resources across different brokerage houses? If brokerage houses can obtain 
unique resources that contribute to their analysts’ forecast accuracy, and analysts cannot transfer 
those resources across different brokerage houses, then the combination of those results would 
suggest that firms can create some competitive advantage. 
I evaluate the research questions by examining the change in the accuracy of quarterly 
earnings forecasts produced by analysts that move to more (less) resourceful brokerage houses but 
maintain coverage of the same firms. If some firms are successful in providing analysts with unique 
resources that contribute to their performance, I expect to find an improvement in forecast accuracy 
following turnover to more resourceful brokerage houses. Furthermore, if the benefits from these 
resources are not transferable when analysts move from one brokerage house to another, I expect 
to find a permanent deterioration in the analysts’ forecast accuracy following turnover to less 
resourceful brokerage houses. I measure the level of brokerage house resources using two 
measures - the percentile ranking of brokerage house size (e.g., Jacob et. al., 1999) and the 
percentile ranking of brokerage house accuracy. Amongst these two measures, the advantage of 




is the performance measure I examine. Additionally, there are boutique brokerage houses that 
specialize in covering a small number of industries, and although relatively small in size, relative 
to larger brokerage houses they could possess superior resources for the specific industries that 
they cover.3 I find that when analysts move to more resourceful brokerage houses, their forecast 
accuracy improves by up to 4.4% in the two years following the turnover, and when analysts move 
to less resourceful brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy deteriorates by as much as 3.1% in 
the two years following the turnover. These results are consistent with brokerage houses providing 
analysts with valuable resources that cannot be fully transferred across brokerage houses.  
While the research design holds the analyst and task constant, it is possible that analyst 
turnovers are endogenously determined, and thus the results might be driven by omitted correlated 
variables. In order to mitigate this concern, I examine a subsample of analyst turnovers that are a 
consequence of brokerage house closures (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2013; and Jacobson et al., 
1993)—and therefore less susceptible to analyst-driven turnovers—and find similar results. A 
related concern is that analysts with positive (negative) trajectories move to more (less) resourceful 
brokerage houses. I do not find statistically significant trends in analyst forecast accuracy in the 
four years leading up to the turnover, which mitigates this concern. 
It may be possible that the improvement (deterioration) in forecast accuracy following 
turnover to more (less) resourceful brokerage houses is driven by changes in incentives to provide 
more (less) accurate forecasts.4 To mitigate this concern, I conduct additional analysis in which I 
                                                             
3 For example, Leerink Swann is a brokerage house specializing in the healthcare industry and is consistently ranked 
as a top research firm. However, this firm has a staff of 13 analysts as of October, 2, 2013, a number lower than both 
the mean and median number of analysts for the entire universe of I/B/E/S brokerage houses. 
4 While this is a valid alternative explanation, it is inconsistent with Hong and Kubik (2003), which finds that forecast 





restrict the sample to turnovers between brokerage houses that potentially have smaller variation 
in incentives, but vary in the resources they provide to analysts. I do this by excluding from the 
sample brokerage houses that employed a star analyst for three consecutive years surrounding the 
turnover. The prestige of the brokerage house is a strong determinant of achieving star status 
(Emery and Li, 2009). One of the reasons for this result is that prestigious brokerage houses have 
strong relationships with large-cap institutional investors who receive more weight in the 
Institutional Investor Magazine star analyst survey. Additionally, large-cap institutional investors 
generally have internal research departments that produce independent forecasts and consequently 
rely less on the sell-side analyst forecasts, while instead demanding better inputs to their models.5 
Therefore, by excluding prestigious brokerage houses that employ star analysts, the sample 
contains brokerage houses that engage in business with small institutional and retail investors, who 
may rely more on forecast accuracy. Hence those brokerage houses would have similar incentives 
to generate accurate forecasts. The findings with this specification are qualitatively unchanged.  
Analysts can improve the accuracy of their forecasts by delaying the report and wait for 
other information to become available. For example, analysts can wait for other analysts to issue 
a report and herd (e.g., Clement and Tse, 2005). I test whether the improvement (deterioration) of 
the forecast accuracy following turnover to better (weaker) brokerage houses is also associated 
with the timeliness of the reports. I find that when analysts move to better brokerage houses, not 
only they become more accurate, but also they become timelier. I also find that when analysts 
move to weaker brokerage houses, not only do they become less accurate, but also they become 
                                                             
5 Institutional Investor Magazine surveys from recent years find that institutional investors most value the industry 




less timely. These results provide additional support to the hypothesis that brokerage house 
resources affect forecast accuracy. 
In order to explore further whether brokerage houses improve analysts’ forecast accuracy 
through the resources they provide, I examine whether analysts are homogeneous in their ability 
to benefit from new resources. Specifically, I hypothesize that experienced analysts will not exhibit 
an improvement in forecast accuracy following turnover to more resourceful brokerage houses for 
two possible reasons.6 First, labor economic theory views labor training and adaptation to new 
resources as a cost incurred by the employee, with the benefit being the present value of the 
additional productivity to be gained from the investment (see Ben-Porath, 1967; Bartel and 
Lichtenberg, 1990; and Bartel and Sicherman, 1993). To the extent that the additional productivity 
or the horizon over which the investment is realized is sufficiently small, the employee might 
choose not to adapt to new resources. Second, research in psychology finds that once employees 
continuously repeat a task, they develop habits and routines that also lead to rigidity and inability 
to adapt to new, possibly better, ways of performing the same task (Dokko et al., 2009). I find 
results in support of these hypotheses. Specifically, I find that while analysts with experience that 
is above the population’s median do not exhibit an improvement in forecast accuracy following 
turnover to more resourceful brokerage houses, analysts with experience that is below the 
population’s median do show improvement of up to 3.97%.  
                                                             
6 While prior literature refer to employees’ age, the use of analysts’ experience is more appropriate in this context 
because analysts do not tend to keep their roles as analysts for very lengthy periods of time due to the demanding 
nature of the job. They either get promoted to managerial positions or switch to other job functions, both of which do 
not require the use of the resources that may improve their forecasting. To illustrate, analysts that were removed from 
the database before 2012 (17,200 analysts) have a mean tenure of 1.75 years. 90% of the analysts remain analysts for 
9.59 years or less, 95% of the analysts remain analysts for 13.99 years or less, and 99% of analysts maintain their role 




To further validate the main result of the paper, I examine whether a specific resource, the 
peer group at the brokerage house, is useful and whether the benefits from peer groups are 
transferable across brokerage houses. I find that when analysts switch to more specialized 
brokerage houses, measured as the percentage of analysts at the brokerage house covering the same 
industry as the analyst that switched, their forecast accuracy improves by 2.8%. In contrast, when 
analysts move to less specialized brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy does not change 
significantly. These results suggest that, consistent with Northcraft and Neale (1993) and Jacob et 
al. (1999), brokerage house specialization provides a useful resource. However, the results also 
imply that the benefits from specialization are transferable across brokerage houses and therefore 
do not contribute to the competitive advantage of a given brokerage house. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while prior literature mainly 
examined the academic industry in order to test whether firms contribute to their employees’ 
performance (e.g., Kim et al., 2009; Azoulay et al., 2010; Waldinger, 2010; Waldinger, 2012; 
Borjas and Doran, 2012), I examine the sell-side equity research industry, which has several 
appealing features. For example, the sell-side equity research industry is highly competitive both 
in terms of the labor market and product market. In addition, the sell-side equity research industry 
is unique in that multiple analysts are performing the same task simultaneously, and the time period 
between the task performed and realization of the quality of the performance is relatively short (in 
my setting, less than three months), which improves the identification. Furthermore, the sell-side 
equity research industry is important in its own right as it plays a major role in capital markets. 
Extant literature has found analysts’ outputs to be informative in both capital and debt markets 
(e.g. Park and Stice, 2000; Bonner et al., 2003; Clement and Tse, 2003; Asiquith et al., 2005; 




sophisticated and unsophisticated investors (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999; 
Amiram et al., 2013).  
Second, this paper extends the results in Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999). The two 
papers show a positive association between brokerage house size and forecast accuracy. This paper 
extends their work by differentiating between the selection effect (i.e., bigger, more prestigious 
brokerage houses are able to attract better analysts), and the direct brokerage house effect that is a 
result of the unique resources brokerage houses provide. This differentiation adds new insight on 
information spillovers and the ability of some brokerage houses to acquire resources that contribute 
to forecast accuracy beyond their analysts’ own abilities, thereby contributing to their competitive 
advantage. In my research design, I am able to provide inferences on the effect of brokerage house 
characteristics by holding the analysts’ characteristics and task constant.  
Third, my paper provides a deeper understanding of and changes some of the inferences 
from Groysberg et al. (2008), who find that star analysts who move to a different brokerage house 
experience a decline in star status. Groysberg et al. (2008) examine changes in reputation, while 
this paper examines changes in performance, which, as Groysberg et al. (2008) note, are two 
different phenomena. Consistent with this view, Clarke et al. (2007) do not find a statistically 
significant change in the forecast accuracy of star analysts following turnover, which is in contrast 
with the findings in Groysberg et al. (2008).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and sample 
construction. Section 3 discusses the research design. In Section 4, I elaborate on the main results. 





2. Data and sample construction 
2.1 General description of the data 
The main data is extracted from the I/B/E/S detail EPS (earnings-per-share) forecast file 
for US listed companies, and is available on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The raw 
data contains, among other variables, the unique identifier of the analyst that produced the data 
(analys), the unique identifier of the brokerage house that employs the analyst (estimator), the 
unique identifier of the covered firm (ticker), the EPS estimate (value), the fiscal period end for 
which the forecast was given (fpedats), the actual realized EPS (actual), and the date of the forecast 
(anndats).  
Since this panel data consists of analyst and brokerage house identifications, it allows 
identifying analyst turnover, which serves as a shock to the resource environment of the analyst. 
In addition, the analysts’ forecasts and realizations of actual EPS enable calculating the forecast 
error, which I then use as a proxy for the analysts’ performance. This proxy is advantageous for 
various reasons. First, earnings forecasts embed the knowledge and insight an analyst has on the 
firm, which is also the source for her recommendations and price targets (Loh and Mian, 2006). 
Second, earnings forecasts are the analysts’ output that are most frequently updated, which 
eliminates staleness in the data and allows me to examine the immediate change in performance 
following turnover. Lastly, forecast accuracy is the analyst output that can be most easily 
evaluated. 
I identify the brokerage house effect in the research design by restricting the sample to 
analysts who moved from one brokerage house to another but continued to cover the same firm. 




allowing for variation in brokerage house characteristics. Furthermore, I benchmark the analyst’s 
forecast accuracy against the consensus at the time of the forecast in order to control for time 
varying forecasting complexity.7   
2.2 Sample selection 
The initial sample size of the I/B/E/S detail EPS file, as downloaded from WRDS, contains 
16,424,697 observations. In cases where the analyst cannot be identified, I/B/E/S assigns those 
analysts the code of 0 or 1. I eliminate those instances, which reduces the sample to 16,218,173 
observations. This raw data represents 20,481 analysts, 5,344 of whom switched brokerage houses 
at least once.8 Since the tests are based on analysts who moved from one brokerage to another at 
least once, I retain that group of 5,344 analysts. I further eliminate inconsistent data in cases where 
the analyst worked for two brokerage houses simultaneously.9 This reduces the sample to 4,203 
analysts.10  
Adjusting to a new workplace and utilizing its resources may not be immediate. In addition, 
given the noise in forecast errors, I require a sufficiently long period pre- and post-turnover. For 
these two reasons, I restrict the sample to analysts who maintained their position in both the former 
and latter brokerage houses for at least one year. This reduces the sample to 2,218 analysts (2,907 
turnovers).11 Despite this constraint, I examine the analysts’ change in forecast accuracy in the 
                                                             
7 I use the consensus because the analyst can choose to herd and follow the consensus when estimating an EPS forecast. 
Therefore, any deviation from the consensus forecast error is driven by the “treatment” analyst’s own expectations.  
8 When removing from the sample transitory analysts who produced forecasts for less than a year, the sample includes 
13,888 analysts, 5,248 of which switched a brokerage house at least once. 
9 The inconsistent data are mostly from earlier periods, before the process became automated. 
10 2,723 of the analysts switched brokerage houses once, 950 of the analysts switched brokerage houses twice, 334 of 
the analysts switched brokerage houses three times, and 196 of the analysts switched brokerage houses more than 
three times. 
11 This large reduction in sample size is consistent with Brown et al. (2013), who find in a survey of sell-side equity 





first and second year after the turnover in order to ascertain that the brokerage house effect is not 
transitory. I restrict the horizon to two years since I am interested in capturing the immediate 
differences between the characteristics of the former and latter brokerage houses, and since 
brokerage houses may evolve in order to meet the needs of clients and to stay competitive. This 
restriction also allows me to mitigate the survivorship bias.  
In order to accurately evaluate the change in performance following turnover, I require that 
the analyst perform the same task following turnover, i.e., the analyst covers the same firm before 
and after turnover. This restriction decreases the sample to 1,603 analysts (2,097 turnovers). In 
addition, I remove turnovers where the lag in employment between one brokerage house and 
another is less than a month. I do so because these turnovers are mostly driven by mergers, and in 
those cases the synergies in resources, and as a consequence the impact on forecast accuracy, might 
not be immediate. This may lead to a bias in the tests against finding significant changes in forecast 
accuracy following turnover. I also exclude turnovers where the lag in employment between one 
brokerage house and another is more than a year, because the change in performance of the analyst 
might be driven by other events during this gap. For example, the analyst might have spent the 
period between employments as an analyst acquiring additional education that might lead to an 
improvement in her forecast accuracy, which is unrelated to the difference in brokerage house 
resources. This reduces the sample further to 1,126 (1,364 turnovers). I also exclude turnovers that 
took place before the year 1992 because of data integrity issues, which reduces the sample to 1,091 




 Another possible concern is that a transitory event has led to the turnover.12 For this reason, 
I exclude from the analyst forecasts made in the last two months at the former brokerage house. 
Because I use quarterly EPS forecasts, the last two constraints provide the additional benefit that 
the switching analyst, by construction, is not forecasting the same quarter results in the former and 
latter brokerage houses.13 I also delete instances with missing necessary variables. The final 
unbalanced panel data contains 1,058 analysts representing 1,273 turnovers. Since each analyst 
covers multiple firms and produces multiple forecasts, the sample, which spans from 1992 to 2010, 
represents 8,787 turnover-covered firm combinations and 98,082 observations. Figure 2 provides 
a timeline describing the research design. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. A detailed description of the variables is 
provided in the table. The number of observations for each variable in the table reflects the number 
of unique observations for the specific variable. For example, the first four variables—the 
percentile change in brokerage house forecast accuracy (ΔBHouseAccuracy), the percentile change 
in brokerage house size (ΔBHouseSize), the experience of the analyst, in years, as of the turnover 
date (Experience), and the percent change in the number of firms the analyst covers 
(ΔWorkload)—are unique to each turnover of each analyst. Therefore, the number of observations 
is restricted to 1,273 unique analyst turnovers. ΔBHouseSpecialization is the change in brokerage 
house specialization following turnover. It is calculated as the change in the proportion of analysts 
employed by the brokerage house who cover the same industry as the industry of the firm covered 
                                                             
12 e.g., a good call by the analyst that increased her reputation, or conversely, a bad call that led to a decline in 
reputation and possible termination. 
13 Another reason for using quarterly rather than annual EPS forecasts is that the horizon in annual forecasts becomes 
a mechanical determinant of accuracy because, for example, in the fourth quarter the results for the first three quarters 




by the “treatment” analyst.14 Industries are defined based on two-digit SIC codes. Since brokerage 
house specialization is calculated for each unique combination of analyst turnover and firm 
covered by the analyst, the number of observations, 8,787, reflects the number of unique analyst 
turnover-covered firm combinations. Lastly, the “treatment” analyst’s relative forecast accuracy 
(FcstAccuracy) and the horizon between the forecast date and the following earnings 
announcement (Horizon) are unique in each observation. 
  ΔBHouseAccuracy and ΔBHouseSize represent the change in brokerage house accuracy 
and brokerage house size, respectively. The value of these variables, by construction, can range 
from -100 (in cases where the analyst moved from the largest/most accurate brokerage house to 
the smallest/least accurate brokerage house) to 100 (in cases where the analyst moved from the 
smallest/least accurate brokerage house to the largest/most accurate brokerage house). The mean 
and median values of the change in brokerage house accuracy are -2.121 and -3.214, respectively. 
This implies that in the sample there are approximately as many analysts who move to more 
accurate brokerage houses as there are analysts who move to less accurate brokerage houses. 
Similarly, the mean and median values of the change in brokerage house size are 0.721 and 0.651, 
respectively. This indicates that the sample is not biased toward analysts who either move to 
smaller or larger brokerages. Analyst relative forecast accuracy, FcstAccuracy, can range from -
100 to 100, by construction. The mean and median of 3.608 and 9.827, respectively, are both 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level. This indicates that, on average, analysts who switch 
brokerage houses perform better than the consensus. 
                                                             





 Correlations are provided in Table 2. Pearson correlations are provided above the diagonal 
and Spearman correlations are below the diagonal. Since the brokerage house characteristics are 
capturing the differences between the former and latter brokerage houses, their correlation with 
forecast accuracy is not meaningful, because forecast accuracy is pooled, encapsulating both the 
former and latter brokerage houses. As a result, and to avoid confusion, I excluded those 
correlations from Table 2. The correlation between forecast accuracy (FcstAccuracy) and horizon 
(Horizon) is -0.027, which, consistent with prior literature, implies that forecasts become more 
precise with time. The correlation between forecast accuracy and experience is -0.011, which 
interestingly implies that more experienced analysts are less accurate, although the correlation is 
economically low. The correlation between the change in brokerage house size (ΔBHouseSize) and 
change in brokerage house specialization (ΔBHouseSpecialization) is -0.212. This negative 
correlation is relatively high by construction, because bigger brokerage houses are less specialized. 
In addition, the correlation between the change in brokerage house accuracy (FcstAccuracy) and 
brokerage house specialization (ΔBHouseSpecialization) is -0.035. Although it may seem 
surprising, because specialization should be positively correlated with accuracy, this correlation is 
difficult to interpret because while brokerage house accuracy is a general measure for the 
brokerage house, brokerage house specialization is specific to the “treatment” analyst and the 
universe of firms she covers. The correlation between the change in brokerage house size 
(ΔBHouseSize) and the change in brokerage house accuracy (FcstAccuracy) is 0.127, which, as 
expected, implies that bigger brokerage houses are also more accurate. Lastly, while the Pearson 
correlation between the change in brokerage house specialization (ΔBHouseSpecialization) and 
experience (Experience) is 0.020, the Spearman correlation is -0.008. This indicates that there are 




are not affected by this since I only use the median values of experience and the sign of the change 
in brokerage house specialization to partition the data, and I do not include these variables in the 
regressions. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Estimating brokerage house resources 
In order to test whether brokerage houses provide analysts with useful resources and 
whether the benefits from these resources are transferable across brokerage houses, I first need to 
identify variation in brokerage house resources. I do so using two proxies. The first proxy is 
brokerage house size (e.g., Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Hilary and Hsu, 2013). The rationale 
behind this proxy is that bigger brokerage houses are expected to utilize their economies of scale 
and have more resources. It is calculated as the percentile ranking of the number of analysts 
employed by the brokerage house in a given year. The weakness of this proxy is that in some cases 
this rationale does not hold. For example, there are boutique brokerage houses that specialize in 
covering a small number of industries. Although relatively small in size, in many cases these 
brokerage houses possess superior resources for the specific industries that they cover, relative to 
bigger brokerage houses. 
Therefore, the second proxy that I use for brokerage house resources that overcomes this 
weakness is the brokerage house aggregate forecast accuracy. I calculate it by ranking all analysts 
covering a given firm in a given year based on the relative accuracy of their forecasts. This 
procedure yields an annual percentile rank for each firm that an analyst covers. As most analysts 
cover multiple firms in a given year, each analyst may have multiple rankings. I therefore calculate 
the mean rank of each analyst in a given year to get an overall annual analyst rank. Since I am 




analysts employed by a given brokerage house in a given year to get a brokerage house measure 
of forecast accuracy. Lastly, I create a percentile rank of this measure in order to mitigate the 
possible effect of outliers and to make this proxy comparable across years. Brokerage house 
accuracy is calculated independently for each analyst turnover in the sample, and it excludes the 
“treatment” analyst in order to avoid sorting the sample based on the dependent variable. The idea 
behind this proxy is that better brokerage house resources should result in better overall brokerage 
house accuracy. One benefit of this measure is that it standardizes the variation in firm and industry 
forecast complexity. Additionally, this measure also overcomes the shortcomings of the use of 
brokerage house size, as previously described. 
3.2 The empirical models 
In order to test the main questions of whether brokerage houses provide useful resources 
to analysts and whether the benefits from those resources are transferable, I estimate the following 
model:15 
FcstAccuracya,u,i,t = β0 + β1MoveDown*Post_Year1a,u,t + β2MoveDown*Post_Year2a,u,t +  
           β3MoveUp*Post_Year1a,u,t + β4MoveUp*Post_Year2a,u,t + β5Horizona,u,i,t +   
                TurnoverFixedEffects+ εa,u,i,t                           (1) 
FcstAccuracy is the analysts’ relative forecast accuracy of a forecast issued by analyst a for 
company i on day t. Since a given analyst may switch brokerage houses multiple times, u represents 
a specific job turnover by analyst a. FcstAccuracy is calculated as the analyst’s absolute forecast 
error scaled by the consensus forecast error minus 1, all multiplied by -100. The consensus is 
calculated on the day of the forecast, excluding the forecast of the “treatment” analyst. Positive 
                                                             
15 I also examine a different specification to address possible clustering of the error terms. Under this alternative 
specification I aggregate the forecasts before and after the turnover, and calculate the aggregated change for each 




values represent forecasts that are more accurate than the consensus, while negative values 
represent forecasts that are less accurate than the consensus. I set all values below -100 to -100 in 
order to eliminate the skewness embedded in the variable. This constrains the range of the variable 
to be between -100 and 100.16 MoveDown*Post_Year1 and MoveDown*Post_Year2 are indicator 
variables equal to 1 for forecasts given in the first and second year after the turnover for analysts 
who switched to less resourceful brokerage houses, and equal to 0 otherwise. MoveUp*Post_Year1 
and MoveUp*Post_Year2 are indicator variables equal to 1 for analysts who move to more 
resourceful brokerage houses in the first and second year after the turnover, and equal to 0 
otherwise. Consistent with prior literature, I also include Horizon, which is the number of days 
between the forecast and the following earnings announcement (e.g., Bae et al., 2008; Cowen et 
al., 2006; Chen and Martin, 2011). Lastly, I include turnover fixed-effects (i.e., I include an 
indicator variable for each turnover of each analyst in the sample). This specification helps to 
control for the analyst’s fixed characteristics at the time of the turnover, such as innate ability and 
experience. 
 The array of possible results from estimating eq. (1) can provide insights on the main 
research question, specifically, whether brokerage houses provide useful resources to analysts and 
whether these resources are transferable across brokerage houses. Finding insignificant 
coefficients for β1 through β4 is consistent with no variation in the contribution of resources to 
forecast accuracy across brokerage houses. This would in turn suggest that the positive association 
between brokerage house size and analyst forecast accuracy found in prior literature is driven 
entirely by analyst selection. Finding insignificant coefficients for β1 and β2 in conjunction with 
positive and significant coefficients for β3 and β4 would suggest that analysts’ forecast accuracy 
                                                             




improves when they switch to more resourceful brokerage houses, consistent with some brokerage 
houses being able to provide new and useful resources. But the lack of deterioration in forecast 
accuracy when analysts switch to less resourceful brokerage houses is consistent with analysts 
being able to absorb and transfer the benefits from these resources to the less resourceful brokerage 
houses. Overall, finding results consistent with this scenario would imply that brokerage houses 
vary in the usefulness of the resources they provide, but these resources do not contribute to a 
competitive advantage because they are transferable across brokerage houses. 
Another possible result is obtaining negative and significant β1 and β2 coefficients and 
positive and significant β3 and β4 coefficients. This result would imply that analysts’ forecast 
accuracy improves when they move to more resourceful brokerage houses and deteriorates when 
they move to less resourceful brokerage houses. Those implications are consistent with some 
brokerage houses providing analysts with useful resources that are not transferable, and therefore 
may contribute to a competitive advantage. It is also possible that all coefficients for β1 through β4 
will be negative. This would imply that turnover has an adverse effect on accuracy that is unrelated 
to the resource environment. This outcome is consistent with analysts having firm-specific human 
capital that is driven by synergies and intimate knowledge of routines in the brokerage house that 
are unrelated to resources (e.g., Groysberg et al., 2008). While there are other possible outcomes, 
I do not discuss them because they are not logically consistent. 
In order to test the change in the market reaction to the analyst forecasts following turnover 






CARa,u,i,t = β0 + β1MoveDowna,u,t + β2MoveUpa,u,t + β3ForecastNewsa,u,i,t + β4ForecastNewsa,u,i,t     
      *MoveDowna,u,t + β5 ForecastNewsa,u,i,t*MoveUpa,u,t + β6PostTurnovera,u,t +        
      β7PostTurnovera,u,t*MoveDowna,u,t + β8PostTurnovera,u,t*MoveUpa,u,t +       
      β9PostTurnovera,u,t*ForecastNewsa,u,i,t + β10PostTurnovera,u,t*           
      ForecastNewsa,u,i,t*MoveDowna,u,t + β11PostTurnovera,u,t*ForecastNewsa,u,i,t*    
      MoveUpa,u,t + FirmFixedEffects + εa,u,i,t                               (2) 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return in the three day window centered on analyst’s a forecast 
date, t, for firm i. ForecastNews is the news component of the analyst forecast and is calculated as 
the percent deviation of the forecast from the prevailing consensus at the time. Post is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for forecasts made following the “treatment” analyst’s switch to a different 
brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. MoveDown is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the “treatment” 
group of analysts (analysts that switch brokerage houses) who switched to less resourceful 
brokerage houses, and 0 otherwise. MoveUp is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the “treatment” 
group of analysts who switched to more resourceful brokerage houses, and 0 otherwise. I also 
include firm fixed effects to control for fixed firm characteristics. The sample for this test also 
includes a control sample of analysts who cover the same firm in the same period as the “treatment” 
group of analysts.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The benefits and transferability of brokerage house resources 
Table 3 provides the results from the estimation of eq. (1). In columns 1 to 3, brokerage 
house resources are estimated using the aggregate brokerage house forecast accuracy, while in 
columns 4 to 6, brokerage house resources are estimated using brokerage house size. As discussed 
in Section 3, MoveDown and MoveUp are indicator variables that equal 1 for analysts who move 
to less and more resourceful brokerage houses, respectively, and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 4, 
I include the entire sample. Using the entire sample can potentially bias the tests against finding 




brokerage houses with little variation in resources. For this reason, in columns 2 and 5, I only 
include turnovers where the change in brokerage house forecast accuracy or size is greater than 10 
percent in absolute value. Similarly, in columns 3 and 6, I only include turnovers where the change 
in brokerage house forecast accuracy or size is greater than 20 percent in absolute value. 
Column 1 reports the results for the entire sample and uses brokerage house forecast 
accuracy as a proxy for resources provided. The results indicate a statistically significant decline 
of 1.650% (t-statistic of -2.50) in forecast accuracy in the year following turnover for analysts who 
move to less accurate brokerage houses. For those same analysts, the decline in forecast accuracy 
is reduced to 0.647% (t-statistic of -0.84) in the second year following turnover, and becomes 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The results also indicate a statistically 
insignificant decline in forecast accuracy for analysts who switch to more accurate brokerage 
houses, with a decrease in forecast accuracy of 0.547% (t-statistic of -0.70) in the first year 
following turnover and a decrease of 0.671% (t-statistic of -0.75) in the second year following 
turnover. As discussed, the sample includes turnovers between brokerage houses that are similar 
in their level of accuracy, and therefore the change in brokerage house resources might not be large 
enough to find a significant change in forecast accuracy. 
Column 2 reports the results for turnovers in which the change in brokerage house forecast 
accuracy is higher than 10% in absolute value (i.e., I exclude turnovers between brokerage houses 
with relatively similar forecast accuracy). The results are also presented in Figure 3. When analysts 
switch to less accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy decreases by 2.324% (t-statistic 
of -2.95) in the first year following turnover and decreases by 2.416% (t-statistic of -2.66) in the 
second year following turnover. Conversely, when analysts switch to more accurate brokerage 




turnover and improves by 2.180% (t-statistic of 1.89) in the second year following turnover. The 
results are consistent with two insights. First, brokerage houses vary in their impact on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Second, the decrease in forecast accuracy following turnover to a less accurate 
brokerage house suggests that some brokerage houses provide analysts with resources that cannot 
be transported across brokerage houses. In column 3, I increase the threshold further and limit the 
sample to turnovers where the change in brokerage house accuracy is higher than 20% in absolute 
value. Under this profile, consistent with expectation, the results become stronger. The increase in 
the strength of the results as the threshold increases provides some validity to the measure of 
aggregate brokerage house accuracy as a proxy for the resources provided by brokerage houses. 
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the results using brokerage house size as the proxy for 
brokerage house resources. The results indicate a decline in forecast accuracy following switches 
to smaller brokerage houses but no statistically significant change in forecast accuracy following 
switches to larger brokerage houses. These results are difficult to interpret in terms of the direct 
brokerage house effect given that most of the turnovers in this sample are between brokerage 
houses that are similar in size, and therefore the change in the resource environment may be 
insignificant. In column 5, where only turnovers between brokerage houses that are at least 10% 
apart in size are maintained, the results become more coherent. When analysts switch to smaller 
brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy decreases by 2.731% (t-statistic of -2.49) and 2.446% (t-
statistic of -1.80) in the first and second year following turnover, respectively. Conversely, when 
analysts switch to larger brokerage houses, and thus obtain better resources, their forecast accuracy 
increases by 2.246% (t-statistic of 1.82) in the first year following turnover and by 4.485% (t-
statistic of 3.10) in the second year following turnover. In order to examine whether there is a 




MoveUp*Post_Year1 and MoveUp*Post_Year2. The difference of 2.239% is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
The results in column 6, with a cutoff threshold of 20%, are qualitatively unchanged 
relative to the results in column 5. When analysts switch to smaller brokerage houses, their forecast 
accuracy deteriorates by 3.725% (t-statistic of -2.06) in the first year following turnover, and is 
positive but statistically insignificant in the second year following turnover. When analysts switch 
to larger brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy improves by 2.555% (t-statistic of 1.28) in the 
first year following turnover and improves by 8.207% (t-statistic of 3.89) in the second year 
following turnover. Comparing the first year and second year coefficients for analysts who switch 
to larger brokerage houses yields a difference of 5.652%, which is statistically significant at the 
1% level. This may indicate that it takes time for analysts to adapt to new resources. It is difficult 
to reach a conclusive explanation because the results using brokerage house accuracy are different.  
To summarize the insight for Table 3, the results are consistent with brokerage houses 
providing analysts with useful resources that contribute to their performance, and cannot be 
transferred with the analysts when they leave to another brokerage house. Furthermore, the positive 
association found in prior literature between brokerage house size and forecast accuracy is not 
driven entirely by analyst selection. Lastly, the results using brokerage house accuracy as a proxy 
for brokerage resource level are more coherent relative to the results when brokerage house size is 
used as a proxy. This is consistent with some small, yet specialized, brokerage houses having better 
resources relative to bigger brokerage houses. 
4.2 Addressing the endogeneity of the turnover decision 
The main identification method I use to isolate the brokerage house effect and keep the 




unobservable reasons for the turnover that are correlated with the differences in the characteristics 
between brokerage houses. For example, it is possible that analysts with positive trends in forecast 
accuracy get promoted to better brokerage houses while analysts with negative trends in forecast 
accuracy get demoted.17 Another possibility is that analysts deliberately move to less prestigious 
brokerage houses because they want to exert less effort.  
In order to address this concern, I employ two tests. First, I use brokerage house closures 
as an exogenous shock to the turnover, since such turnover is less susceptible to analyst choice and 
should be less correlated with performance.18 Second, I examine whether there is a trend in forecast 
accuracy in the four years leading up to the turnover. The results for the first test using brokerage 
house closures are presented in Table 4. Column 1 presents the results for the turnovers that are 
driven by closures and column 2 presents the results for the rest of the sample. The results in both 
columns are consistent with the results in Table 3. Specifically, when analysts move to less 
accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy deteriorates, and when they move to more 
accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy improves. The similarity of the results in 
columns 1 and 2 indicates that the results in Table 3 are not driven exclusively by either group. 
In Table 5, I report the results of the trend in forecast accuracy in the four years leading up 
to the turnover. In column 1, I use brokerage house forecast accuracy as a proxy for resources, 
with a minimum change in brokerage house quality following turnover of 10%(similar to column 
2 of Table 3). The differences between years is not statistically significant at conventional levels, 
and there is no observable trend for both the group of analysts who move to less accurate brokerage 
                                                             
17 For example, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that accurate analysts are more likely to get promoted and less accurate 
analysts are more likely to get demoted. Their analysis is cross-sectional and does not examine trends.  






houses and the group of analysts who move to more accurate brokerage houses. In column 2, 
brokerage house size is used as a proxy for the level of brokerage house resources. The sample 
includes only turnovers to brokerage houses that are at least 10% larger or smaller than the size of 
the former brokerage house (similar to column 5 of Table 3). Here again, there is no observable, 
statistically significant trend in forecast accuracy in the four years prior to the turnover. 
Overall, the main findings of the paper hold when I use a subsample of turnovers that are 
a result of brokerage house closures. In addition, I do not find a positive trend in forecast accuracy 
of analysts who move to more resourceful brokerage houses in the four years leading up to the 
turnover, and I do not find a negative trend in the forecast accuracy of analysts who move to less 
resourceful brokerage houses in the four years prior to the turnover. These results mitigate, 
although do not completely eliminate, the concerns regarding the endogeneity of the turnover 
decision. 
4.3 The role of the analysts’ objective as an alternative explanation to the results 
The main finding of this paper is that when analysts move to more accurate (larger) 
brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy improves, and when analysts move to less accurate 
(smaller) brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy deteriorates. An explanation for these results 
is that they are driven by the resources that brokerage houses provide. However, there are 
alternative explanations for the variation in forecast accuracy, as described in Figure 1. One 
alternative explanation for the results is the variation in the importance of forecast accuracy across 
brokerage houses. Put differently, it is possible that the results in the paper are not driven by the 
difference in resources brokerage houses provide, but by the difference in the objectives brokerage 




While the concern that changes in forecast accuracy arise from differences in the objective 
function of brokerage houses is theoretically possible, it is not consistent with prior literature. 
Specifically, while there might be variation in the importance of forecast accuracy to brokerage 
houses, prior literature finds that forecast accuracy is an important predictor of career outcome for 
analysts. For example, Mikhail et al. (1999) find that low forecast accuracy predicts turnovers; Wu 
and Zang (2009) find that low forecast accuracy predicts analyst turnover in mergers. In addition, 
the results in the paper are not consistent with this alternative explanation. The results in Table 7 
show that while both experienced and less experienced analysts suffer a deterioration in 
performance when they move to less accurate brokerage houses, only the less experienced analysts 
exhibit an improvement when they move to more accurate brokerage houses. If the results were 
only driven by the incentives explanation, then we should not observe a difference between the 
experienced and less experienced analysts with respect to their change in performance following 
turnover to more accurate brokerage houses (as they should respond to the incentives in a similar 
way). Furthermore, Table 8 shows how a specific resource, the peer group covering the same 
industry, affects forecast accuracy after controlling for brokerage house size, which also captures 
the differences in the objective functions of brokerage houses.  
In order to address this concern more directly, I eliminate from the sample brokerage 
houses that may have lower incentives to maximize their analysts’ forecast accuracy. Large 
institutional investors and hedge funds possess their own research capabilities and produce 
independent forecasts. Consequently, these large institutional investors and hedge funds care about 
and pay for the sell-side analysts’ insights and inputs, rather than the sell-side analysts’ reports.19 
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Therefore, it is possible that brokerage houses aiming to attract large institutional investors might 
deemphasize forecast accuracy and focus on outputs that large institutional investors demand, such 
as private meetings with management and raw information. I identify these brokerage houses by 
examining if they were listed in the Institutional Investor Magazine star ranking in the three-year 
period surrounding the turnover. Since the votes used in the Institutional Investor Magazine star 
ranking are weighted based on the size of the money management firm, it is extremely hard to 
reach star analyst status in multiple years without strong business relationships with the largest 
money management firms. Therefore, by excluding brokerage houses with star analysts, I retain a 
group of brokerage houses with lower variance in the importance of forecast accuracy, because 
these brokerage houses are more likely to rely on business with clients who possess limited 
research capabilities and do rely on the sell-side analysts’ earnings estimates. 
The results for this test are provided in Table 6 and are consistent with prior findings. 
Specifically, when analysts switch to less accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy 
decreases by 1.840% (t-statistic of -1.81) in the first year following turnover and decreases by 
2.522% (t-statistic of -2.13) in the second year following turnover. When analysts move to a more 
accurate brokerage house, their forecast accuracy improves by 4.121% (t-statistic of 3.23) in the 
first year following turnover and improves by 2.619% (t-statistic of 1.72) in the second year 
following turnover. 
4.4 The timeliness of analyst forecasts following turnover 
It is possible that the tradeoff between forecast accuracy and timeliness, and not only 
resources, drive the main results. Specifically, analysts can increase their forecast accuracy by 
delaying their forecasts until more information is revealed. This way, analysts can increase forecast 




To address this concern, I examine the change in the timeliness of the analysts’ reports 
following turnover to better (weaker) brokerage houses. To do this I use firms’ earnings 
announcements as a proxy for an information event that would lead to a forecast revision and I 
then rank the analysts based on the day they issued the forecast relative to the earnings 
announcement date. The model is as follows:  
Timelinessa,u,i,q = β0 + β1MoveDown*Post_Year1a,u,q + β2MoveDown*Post_Year2a,u,q +   
                 β3MoveUp*Post_Year1a,u,q + β4MoveUp*Post_Year2a,u,q +    
                TurnoverFixedEffects+ εa,u,i,q                              (3) 
where Timeliness is the rank of analyst a relative to other analysts covering firm i with respect to 
the order the analysts release their report following firm i’s earnings announcement for quarter q. 
The rank is then scaled by the highest value of the rank and multiplied by 100 in order to obtain a 
variable that ranges from 0 to 100. u represents analyst a’s turnover since a specific analyst can 
change brokerage houses multiple times. MoveDown*Post_Year1 and MoveDown*Post_Year2 
are indicator variables equal to 1 for forecasts made in the first and second year after the turnover 
for analysts who switched to less resourceful brokerage houses, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
MoveUp*Post_Year1 and MoveUp*Post_Year2 are indicator variables equal to 1 for analysts who 
move to more resourceful brokerage houses in the first and second year following the turnover, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. I include turnover fixed-effects (i.e., I include an indicator variable for 
each turnover of each analyst in the sample). This specification helps to control for the analyst’s 
fixed characteristics at the time of the turnover, such as innate ability and experience. 
 The results, presented in Table 7, indicate that when analysts move to more (less) 
resourceful brokerage houses, they become more (less) timely. Specifically, when analysts move 
to less accurate brokerage houses their relative timeliness decreases by 3.056% (t-statistic of 3.78) 




turnover. When analysts move to more accurate brokerage houses, their relative timeliness 
improves by 3.632% (t-statistic of -2.89) in the first year following turnover and by 2.340% (t-
statistic of -1.69) in the second year following turnover. The results are stronger when brokerage 
house size is used as a proxy for brokerage house resources, and are presented in column 2.  
 To summarize, the results in Table 7, in conjunction with the results in the other tables, 
suggest that when analysts move to more resourceful brokerage houses, not only do they become 
more accurate but also that they become faster in responding to new information and issuing a 
report. Furthermore, when analysts move to less resourceful brokerage houses, they become both 
less accurate and less timely. These results lend further support to the effect of brokerage house 
resources on forecast accuracy. 
5. Additional analysis 
5.1 Analysts’ ability to adapt to new resources 
So far, the results support the notion that some brokerage houses can acquire a competitive 
advantage that improves the forecast accuracy of their analysts. The next question that I investigate 
is whether analysts are homogeneous in their ability to adapt to new brokerage houses and utilize 
their resources. Table 8 provides insights on this question. I re-estimate eq. (1) separately for 
experienced and less experienced analysts. Experienced analysts are defined as analysts with 
experience that is above or equal to the population’s median, and less experienced analysts are 
defined as analysts with experience that is lower than the population’s median.20 The results in 
column 1, which represent less experienced analysts, are similar to the results in Table 3. 
                                                             
20 The number of turnovers that include analysts with experience that is lower than the population’s median experience 
is 440 (column 1), and the number of turnovers with analysts’ experience above or equal to the population’s median 
experience is 392 (column 2). The number of turnovers is not the same because I determine the median based on all 
turnovers in the sample, including turnovers to brokerage houses with similar forecast accuracy, while I exclude from 




Specifically, the forecast accuracy of analysts who move to less accurate brokerage houses 
deteriorates by 2.960% (t-statistic of -2.59) in the first year following turnover and deteriorates by 
3.266% (t-statistic of -2.46) in the second year following turnover. When analysts move to  more 
accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy improves by 3.805% (t-statistic of 2.91) in the 
first year following turnover and improves by 3.968% (t-statistic of 2.44) in the second year 
following turnover.  
The results in column 2 reveal that experienced analysts are affected differently. While 
there is a reduction in forecast accuracy following turnover to less accurate brokerage houses, there 
is not a significant improvement, either economically or statistically, following turnover to more 
accurate brokerage houses. When experienced analysts move to less accurate brokerage houses, 
their forecast accuracy decreases by 1.819% (t-statistic of -1.68) in the first year following turnover 
and by 1.729% (t-statistic of -1.38) in the second year following turnover. In contrast, when 
experienced analysts move to more accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy improves 
by only 0.839% (t-statistic of 0.60) in the first year following turnover and improves by only 
0.627% (t-statistic of 0.38) in the second year following turnover. I employ a non-parametric test 
to compare the coefficient estimates for experienced and less experienced analysts. The results 
reveal that the difference between the two groups is only significant in cases where analysts switch 
to more accurate brokerage houses. The difference in the improvement in the first year following 
turnover (MoveUp*Post_Year1) is 2.966% and is significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the 
difference in improvement in the second year following turnover is 3.341% and is also significant 
at the 10% level. 
As discussed in Section 1, the results are consistent with experienced analysts not viewing 




time over which the investment is expected to be realized is sufficiently low. Another alternative 
explanation for the results is that experienced analysts become fixated on the way they perform 
their task and have difficulties adapting to new resources that can potentially improve their 
performance. Additionally, experienced analysts may be farther along the learning curve and 
therefore may have lower possibility of improving. This result suggests that while brokerage 
houses may be able to provide useful resources, they do not affect the forecast accuracy of 
experienced analysts.  
5.2 Which specific resources provide a competitive advantage? 
Table 9 provides the results from estimating a variation of eq. (1) to examine the usefulness 
of peer groups and the ability of analysts to transfer the benefits of their peers across brokerage 
houses. More specialized brokerages with a greater proportion of analysts covering the same 
industry can benefit each analyst by knowledge sharing. On the other hand, greater concentration 
may lead to rivalry among peers, which can attenuate the benefits from peer groups (e.g., 
Groysberg et al., 2011; and Groysberg and Healy, 2013). The results are presented in column 1. I 
find that when analysts move to brokerage houses that have a smaller peer group covering the 
same industry, there is no statistically significant change in forecast accuracy (coefficient estimate 
of -0.542 with a t-statistic of -0.44). Conversely, when analysts switch to brokerage houses with a 
larger peer group, their forecast accuracy improves by 2.754% (t-statistic of 1.97). The two 
findings, taken together, support the argument that peer groups are a useful resource from which 
analysts can learn. However, analysts are able to transfer the knowledge from this resource when 
they leave, which suggests it might not contribute to a competitive advantage. Since peer groups 
are strongly correlated with size, I add brokerage house size as a control variable. The 




since the proxy for the peer groups is the percentage of analysts covering the same industry. 
Therefore, this proxy may also capture other specialization resources and not just the peer group 
effect.  
In column 2, I examine the impact of workload, defined as the number of firms the analyst 
covers, on forecast accuracy. The results are statistically insignificant, regardless of the change. 
This may be driven by workload being an inappropriate proxy for effort. For example, in many 
brokerage houses, analysts are required to interact with clients and assist in sales. While I do not 
have data to measure the amount of time analysts invest on this task, it should reduce the time 
analysts allocate to research. Lastly, in column 3 I report the results of estimating the combined 
impact of peer groups and workload. The results are similar to those in columns 1 and 2. To 
summarize, the results in Table 9 are consistent with peer groups being a useful resource that 
analysts can learn from and transfer across brokerage houses, and therefore may not provide a 
competitive advantage.  
5.3 Addressing potential autocorrelation of error terms 
The research design exploits the change in the forecast accuracy of analysts following 
turnover, and includes each forecast made by the analyst for each firm that she covers before and 
after the turnover. This research design can lead to deflated standard errors since the firms a given 
analyst covers are not independent of each other (i.e., analysts tend to specialize in a specific 
industry) and multiple forecasts for a given firm may also violate independence. In order to address 
this concern, in the main tests I employ two-way clustered standard errors by analyst turnover (to 
address the correlation among different forecasts made by a given analyst) and year (to address 




aggregate the analysts’ relative forecast accuracy in the year before the turnover and the two years 
following turnover (i.e., I take the mean forecast accuracy of all forecasts made by a given analyst 
for all the firms that she covers, once during the year before the turnover, and once for the two 
years following the turnover taken together). I then calculate the change in the forecast accuracy 
per turnover, which is now the unit of observation. Under this specification, I have a total of 1,273 
observations, denoted ΔFcstAccuracya,u, where ΔFcstAccuracy is the change in forecast accuracy 
for each turnover, u, by each analyst, a. I then examine whether the mean of the change in the 
forecast accuracy is statistically significant and in the predicted direction (i.e, positive for analysts 
that transition to bigger/more accurate firms, and negative for analysts that move to smaller/less 
accurate firms). 
The results are presented in Table 10. Column 1 represents the entire sample, regardless of 
the change in brokerage house quality. For the entire sample, the change in forecast accuracy 
following turnover is 0.004% and is not statistically significant (t-statistic of 0.00). When the 
sample is reduced to analysts who move to more accurate brokerage houses, the results show that 
their forecast accuracy improves. Specifically, when I include all turnovers to more accurate 
brokerage houses, the change in the analyst’s forecast accuracy is 1.852% and is not statistically 
significant. When I restrict the sample to turnovers to brokerage houses that are at least 10% more 
accurate than the former brokerage houses, the relative forecast accuracy improves by 3.655% (t-
statistic of 2.17). When the sample is further constrained to turnovers to brokerage houses that are 
at least 20% more accurate, the results become even stronger, with an improvement in the relative 
forecast accuracy of 6.650% (t-statistic of 2.80). The results are reversed for analysts who move 
to less accurate firms. For the entire sample of analysts who move to less accurate firms, their 




statistic of -1.40). When the sample is restricted to turnovers to brokerage houses that are at least 
10% less accurate, the analysts’ relative forecast accuracy deteriorates by 3.712% (t-statistic of -
3.02). When the sample is restricted further to turnovers to brokerage houses that are at least 20% 
less accurate, the deterioration in forecast accuracy becomes stronger (-4.614% and a t-statistic of 
-2.84). The results are similar when brokerage house quality is defined by brokerage house size, 
and therefore are not discussed. 
To summarize, the main results in the paper are robust to the aggregation of the change in 
the analysts’ forecast accuracy at the turnover level. This specification addresses the concern that 
the error terms are auto-correlated. I find that when analysts move to bigger/more accurate 
brokerage houses, their relative forecast accuracy improves, and when they move to smaller/less 
accurate brokerage houses, their forecast accuracy deteriorates. 
5.4 The change in market reaction to analyst forecasts following turnover 
The results to this point are consistent with some brokerage houses providing analysts with 
useful resources that are not easily transferred across brokerage houses. The question addressed in 
this section is whether investors understand the usefulness of brokerage house resources and 
change their response to analyst forecasts following turnover that is consistent with the change in 
the resource environment. The results for this question, based on the estimation of eq. (2), are 
provided in Table 11. 
Column 1 represents the results using brokerage house size as a proxy for the brokerage 
resource level, and column 2 represents the results using brokerage house aggregate forecast 
accuracy as a proxy for the brokerage house resource level. The coefficient estimate that captures 




4.55) in column 1 and 0.006 (t-statistic of 6.06) in column 2. The difference between the estimation 
of this variable in columns 1 and 2 is 0.001, and is statistically insignificant. This coefficient 
estimate is the benchmark based on the control group of analysts who did not switch brokerage 
houses in the evaluation period. There is no change in market reaction for the control group in the 
period following the turnover (the coefficient estimate of PostTurnover*ForecastNews is -0.002 
with a t-statistic of -1.44 in column 1 and -0.001 with a t-statistic of -0.83 in column 2). Moving 
to the variables that capture the change in market reaction to forecasts following turnover, 
PostTurnover*ForecastNews*MoveDown and PostTurnover*ForecastNews*MoveUp, the results 
in column 1 indicate a reduction in market reaction to news issued by analysts moving to smaller 
brokerage houses (coefficient estimate of -0.013 with a t-statistic of -1.88) and an increase in 
market reaction to news issued by analysts moving to bigger brokerage houses (coefficient 
estimate of 0.014 with a t-statistic of 2.72). The coefficient estimates in column 2, where brokerage 
house forecast accuracy is used as a proxy for resources provided, are not statistically or 
economically significant, regardless of the direction of the change. 
To summarize, I find that the market reaction to analyst forecasts increases when analysts 
move to larger brokerage houses, and the market reaction decreases when analysts move to smaller 
brokerage houses. I do not find statistically significant changes in market reaction when I use 
brokerage house accuracy as a proxy for the brokerage house resource level. There are two possible 
explanations for the difference. Firstly, it is possible that bigger brokerage houses have better sales 
and distribution capabilities, which drive the results. Secondly, investors may disregard the 






In this paper, I examine whether firms in knowledge-intensive industries contribute to their 
employees’ output through the resources they provide, and the extent to which employees can 
transfer the benefits from those resources when they leave the firm. To provide insight into this 
question, I examine the sell-side equity research industry, which not only is an important industry 
in financial markets, but also has some unique features that contribute to the identification of the 
research design.  
Specifically, I use a sample of analysts who move from one brokerage house to another 
while maintaining coverage of the same firms. This allows me to hold the analysts’ innate abilities 
and characteristics constant, as well as the analysts’ task (since they cover the same firms pre- and 
post-turnover). In addition, in many cases, there are multiple analysts working at different 
brokerage houses who cover the same firm, i.e., are performing the same task. I use this unique 
feature to benchmark the performance of the analysts’ who switched brokerage houses, which 
allows me to control for time-varying differences in task complexity.  
I find that when analysts move to more resourceful brokerage houses, their forecast 
accuracy improves, and when analysts move to less resourceful brokerage houses, their forecast 
accuracy deteriorates. The results are consistent with some brokerage houses being able to achieve 
a competitive advantage by providing analysts with useful resources that are not easily transferable 
across brokerage houses. I provide additional evidence in support of the conclusion that examines 
alternative explanations, econometric robustness, and endogeneity concerns. 
I also find that, consistent with the labor economics and psychology literature, experienced 
analysts do not improve when they move to brokerage houses with better resources. In contrast, 




both groups experience a similar decline in performance. Lastly, I find evidence consistent with 
peer-groups being a resource whose benefits are transferable. Specifically, I find that when 
analysts move to a more specialized brokerage house, their performance improves. However, when 
analysts move to a less specialized brokerage house, their performance does not deteriorate.  
The paper contributes to prior literature in accounting and economics by providing the new 
insight that firms in at least one knowledge-intensive industry, the sell-side equity research 
industry, are able to attain a competitive advantage through the resources they provide to their 
employees. This setting is not only important to our understanding of capital markets and the role 
of information intermediaries, but also overcomes many of the shortcomings of prior studies that 
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Figure 2: Timeline 
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Figure 3:  Change in analysts’ forecast accuracy following a turnover to a 






























Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. ΔBHouseAccuracy is the change in the brokerage 
house aggregate forecast accuracy, calculated as the percentile ranking of the forecast accuracy of the latter 
brokerage house less the percentile ranking of the forecast accuracy of the former brokerage house. ΔBHouseSize 
is the change in the brokerage house size following turnover, calculated as the percentile ranking of the latter 
brokerage house size less the percentile ranking of the former brokerage house size. Experience is the number of 
years elapsed from the time the analyst entered the I/B/E/S database to the last forecast at the former brokerage 
house before the turnover. ΔWorkload is percent change in workload following turnover. Workload is calculated 
as the number of firms covered by the analyst. FirmsCovered is the number of the same firms covered by the 
analyst before and after the turnover. ΔBHouseSpecialization is the change in brokerage house specialization 
following turnover, calculated as the change in the percentage of analysts employed by the brokerage house who 
cover the same industry as the firm covered by the “treatment” analyst. Industry is defined by the 2-digit SIC 
code. FcstAccuracy is the relative forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the 
analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time of the forecast, which excludes 
the “treatment” analyst. The value of FcstAccuracy is set to be between -100 and 100. Horizon is the number of 
days between the analyst forecast and the earnings announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. 
Variable N Mean Std Dev P25 P50 P75 
ΔBHouseAccuracy 1,273  -2.121 23.544 -17.861 -3.214 12.807 
ΔBHouseSize 1,273  0.721 14.570 -6.459 0.651 7.619 
Experience 1,273  6.428 4.802 2.789 4.962 8.685 
ΔWorkload 1,273  -0.494 56.472 -30.000 -9.375 12.500 
FirmsCovered 1,273 6.903 4.223 4.000 6.000 10.000 
ΔBHouseSpecialization 8,787  -0.256 15.485 -13.980 0.000 4.037 
FcstAccuracy 98,082  3.608 64.723 -42.414 9.827 52.722 








Table 2: Correlation matrix 
The table reports the correlations between the main variables. Pearson correlations are above the diagonal and Spearman correlations are below. ΔBHouseAccuracy 
is the change in the brokerage house aggregate forecast accuracy, calculated as the percentile ranking of the forecast accuracy of the latter brokerage house less the 
percentile ranking of the forecast accuracy of the former brokerage house. ΔBHouseSize is the change in the brokerage house size following turnover, calculated as 
the percentile ranking of the latter brokerage house size less the percentile ranking of the former brokerage house size. Experience is the number of years elapsed 
from the time the analyst entered the I/B/E/S database to the last forecast at the former brokerage house before the turnover. ΔWorkload is the percent change in 
workload following turnover. Workload is calculated as the number of firms covered by the analyst. ΔBHouseSpecialization is the change in brokerage house 
specialization following turnover, calculated as the change in the percentage of analysts employed by the brokerage house who cover the same industry as the firm 
covered by the “treatment” analyst. Industry is defined by the 2-digit SIC code. FcstAccuracy is the relative forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-
1)*100. FE is the analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time of the forecast, which excludes the “treatment” analyst. The 
value of FcstAccuracy is set to be between -100 and 100. Horizon is the number of days between the analyst forecast and the earnings announcement in which the 
actual earnings are reported. NM refers to correlations that are not meaningful, and are therefore excluded from the table. Statistical significance is based on two-
sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
 ΔBHAccuracy ΔBHSize Experience ΔWorkload ΔBHSpecialization FcstAccuracy Horizon 


































































Table 3: The impact of the change in brokerage house resources on analyst forecast accuracy 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1). Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for brokerage house resources. Characteristic cutoff value 
represents the minimum change in the brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in the sample. FcstAccuracy is the 
relative forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time 
of the forecast, which excludes the “treatment” analyst. MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable set to 1 when an analyst moves to a less (more) resourceful 
brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. Post_Year1 (Post_Year1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the first (second) year following turnover, and 0 otherwise. Horizon 
is the number of days between the analyst forecast and the earnings announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. Statistical significance is based on two-
sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Brokerage house characteristic Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy Size Size Size 
Characteristic cutoff value None >10% >20% None >10% >20% 
Dependent variable FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy 
              
Intercept 8.179*** 7.092*** 5.475*** 8.153*** 4.129*** 1.642 
 (13.13) (9.15) (5.48) (13.05) (4.17) (1.04) 
MoveDown*Post_Year1 -1.650** -2.324*** -2.602** -2.196*** -2.731** -3.725** 
 (-2.50) (-2.95) (-2.56) (-3.07) (-2.49) (-2.06) 
MoveDown*Post_Year2 -0.647 -2.416*** -3.054*** -2.948*** -2.446* -1.814 
 (-0.84) (-2.66) (-2.61) (-3.46) (-1.80) (-0.81) 
MoveUp*Post_Year1 -0.547 2.191** 3.617*** -0.296 2.246* 2.555 
 (-0.70) (2.26) (2.78) (-0.42) (1.82) (1.28) 
MoveUp*Post_Year2 -0.671 2.180* 4.424*** 1.144 4.485*** 8.207*** 
 (-0.75) (1.89) (2.80) (1.42) (3.10) (3.89) 
Horizon -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.039*** -0.061*** -0.035*** -0.011 
 (-8.48) (-6.10) (-3.39) (-8.45) (-3.18) (-0.61) 
       
Fixed Effects Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover 
Clustered Standard Errors Turnover-Year Turnover-Year Turnover-Year Turnover-Year Turnover-Year Turnover-Year 
       
Observations 98,082 61,327 32,577 98,082 33,240 13,565 
# of turnovers 1,273 832 457 1,273 522 234 




Table 4: The impact of the change in brokerage house resources on analyst 
forecast accuracy: evidence from brokerage house closures 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1). Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for 
brokerage house resources. The first column includes turnovers that are a result of brokerage house closures, and 
the second column includes turnovers that are not a result of closures. Characteristic cutoff value represents the 
minimum change in the brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in 
the sample. FcstAccuracy is the relative forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the 
analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time of the forecast, which excludes 
the “treatment” analyst. MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable set to 1 when an analyst moves to a less 
(more) resourceful brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. Post_Year1 (Post_Year1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 
in the first (second) year following turnover, and 0 otherwise. Horizon is the number of days between the analyst 
forecast and the earnings announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. Statistical significance is based 
on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
Brokerage house characteristic Accuracy Accuracy 
Group Closures Non-Closures 
Characteristic cutoff value >10% >10% 
Dependent variable FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy 
      
Intercept 5.588** 7.233*** 
 (2.05) (8.96) 
MoveDown*Post_Year1 -6.376*** -1.891** 
 (-2.63) (-2.28) 
MoveDown*Post_Year2 -5.644** -2.070** 
 (-2.20) (-2.14) 
MoveUp*Post_Year1 6.635** 1.868* 
 (2.25) (1.84) 
MoveUp*Post_Year2 4.168 2.023* 
 (1.07) (1.68) 
Horizon -0.051* -0.055*** 
 (-1.66) (-5.88) 
   
Fixed Effects Turnover Turnover 
Clustered Standard Errors Turnover-Year Turnover-Year 
   
Observations 5,108 56,219 





Table 5: Time series trend in analyst forecast accuracy prior to turnover 
The table reports the results from estimating a variation of equation (1). Brokerage house characteristics represent 
the proxy for brokerage house resources. Characteristic cutoff value represents the minimum changes in the 
brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in the sample. 
FcstAccuracy is the relative forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the analyst 
forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time of the forecast, which excludes the 
“treatment” analyst. MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable set to 1 when an analyst moves to a less (more) 
resourceful brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. Yeart-i is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the i-th year relative to 
the year of the turnover and 0 otherwise. Horizon is the number of days between the analyst forecast and the 
earnings announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. Statistical significance is based on two-sided t-
tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
  (1) (2) 
Brokerage House Characteristic Accuracy Size 
Characteristic cutoff value >10% >10% 
Dependent variable FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy 
      
Intercept 7.784*** 3.131** 
 (7.77) (2.02) 
MoveDown*Yeart-4 0.804 3.122 
 (0.46) (0.94) 
MoveDown*Yeart-3 -0.455 0.363 
 (-0.31) (0.14) 
MoveDown*Yeart-2 0.098 1.042 
 (0.09) (0.56) 
MoveUp*Yeart-4 2.679 3.563 
 (1.43) (1.46) 
MoveUp*Yeart-3 -1.950 -1.859 
 (-0.97) (-0.66) 
MoveUp*Yeart-2 -1.048 0.352 
 (-0.78) (0.15) 
Horizon -0.067*** -0.039** 
 (-5.61) (-1.97) 
Fixed effects Turnover Turnover 
Clustered standard errors Turnover Turnover 
Observations 50,784 17,996 






Table 6: The impact of the change in brokerage house resources on analyst 
forecast accuracy for non-Institutional Investor ranked brokerage 
houses 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1). Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for 
brokerage house resources. Characteristic cutoff value represents the minimum change in the brokerage house 
characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in the sample. FcstAccuracy is the relative 
forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the analyst forecast error and 
ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time of the forecast, which excludes the “treatment” analyst. 
MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable set to 1 when an analyst moved to a less (more) resourceful 
brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. Post_Year1 (Post_Year1) is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the first (second) 
year following turnover, and 0 otherwise. Horizon is the number of days between the analyst forecast and the 
earnings announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. Statistical significance is based on two-sided t-
tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
 
  (1) 
Brokerage house characteristic Accuracy 
Characteristic cutoff value >10% 
Dependent variable FcstAccuracy 














 Fixed Effects Turnover 
Clustered Standard Errors Turnover-Year 
  
Observations 37,467 
# of turnovers 550 





Table 7: The change in the timeliness of analyst reports following turnover 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (3). Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for 
brokerage house resources. Characteristic cutoff value represents the minimum change in the brokerage house 
characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in the sample. Timeliness is the rank of the 
analyst’s a report date relative to other analysts covering firm i, subsequent to firm i’s earnings announcement for 
quarter q. This variable is scaled by the largest value for the rank. MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable set 
to 1 when an analyst moves to a less (more) resourceful brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. Post_Year1 (Post_Year1) 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the first (second) year following turnover, and 0 otherwise. Statistical significance 
is based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
  (1) (2) 
Brokerage house characteristic Accuracy Size 
Characteristic cutoff value >10% >10% 
Dependent variable Timeliness Timeliness 
      
Intercept 37.561*** 40.615*** 
 (73.34) (60.33) 
MoveDown*Post_Year1 3.056*** 7.757*** 
 (3.78) (7.16) 
MoveDown*Post_Year2 2.033** 9.320*** 
 (2.27) (6.80) 
MoveUp*Post_Year1 -3.632*** -14.916*** 
 (-2.89) (-8.78) 
MoveUp*Post_Year2 -2.340* -16.674*** 
 (-1.69) (-8.82) 
   
Fixed Effects Turnover Turnover 
Clustered Standard Errors Turnover-Period Turnover-Period 
Observations 34,543 18,908 
# of turnovers 832 522 






Table 8: Analyst experience and the effect of brokerage houses resources on 
analyst forecast accuracy 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1). Analyst experience is defined as low if the experience of the 
analyst is lower than the population’s median experience, and defined as high if it is equal or greater than the population’s 
median experience. Experience is calculated as the number of years between the analyst’s first forecast on I/B/E/S and 
her last forecast prior to the turnover. Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for brokerage house resources. 
Characteristic cutoff value represents the minimum change in the brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that 
is required in order to be included in the sample. FcstAccuracy is the relative forecast accuracy, estimated by 
(│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the 
time of the forecast, which excludes the “treatment” analyst. MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable set to 1 when 
an analyst moves to a less (more) resourceful brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. Post_Year1 (Post_Year1) is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 in the first (second) year following turnover, and 0 otherwise. Horizon is the number of days between 
the analyst forecast and the earnings announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. Statistical significance is 
based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
  (1) (2)  
Analyst Experience Low High Difference 
Characteristic cutoff value Accuracy > 10%  
Dependent variable FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy 
       
Intercept 8.072*** 6.243*** 1.829 
 (7.38) (5.71)  
MoveDown*Post_Year1 -2.960*** -1.819* -1.141 
 (-2.59) (-1.68) [0.257] 
MoveDown*Post_Year2 -3.266** -1.729 -1.537 
 (-2.46) (-1.38) [0.222] 
MoveUp*Post_Year1 3.805*** 0.839 2.966* 
 (2.91) (0.60) [0.082] 
MoveUp*Post_Year2 3.968** 0.627 3.341* 
 (2.44) (0.38) [0.070] 
Horizon -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.004 
 (-4.25) (-4.35) [0.407] 
    
Fixed Effects Turnover Turnover  
Clustered Standard Errors Turnover-Year Turnover-Year  
Observations 28,048 33,279  
# of turnovers 440 392  






Table 9: The impact of the change in brokerage house characteristics on 
analyst forecast accuracy 
The table reports the results from a variation of estimating equation (1). Characteristic cutoff value represents the 
minimum change in the brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in 
the sample. FcstAccuracy is the relative forecast accuracy, estimated by (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the 
analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time of the forecast, which excludes the 
“treatment” analyst. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the period following the turnover and 0 otherwise. 
LessSpecialized (MoreSpecialized) is an indicator variable equal to 1 following turnover to a less (more) specialized 
brokerage house. Brokerage house specialization is the percentage of analysts at the brokerage house who cover the 
industry of the firm that is covered by the “treatment” analyst. Industries are defined using 2-digit SIC codes. 
MoreWorkload (LessWorkload) is an indicator variable equal to 1 for positive (negative) changes in the number of 
firms covered by the “treatment” analyst following turnover, and 0 otherwise. BrokerageSize is the percentile ranking 
of the brokerage house size. Horizon is the number of days between the analyst forecast and the earnings 
announcement in which the actual earnings are reported. Statistical significance is based on two-sided t-tests and 
indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Characteristic Cutoff >10% >10% >10% 
Dependent Variable FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy FcstAccuracy 
        
Intercept -11.901** -10.543* -12.245** 
 (-2.25) (-1.92) (-2.30) 
Post*LessSpecialized -0.542  -0.069 
 (-0.44)  (-0.05) 
Post*MoreSpecialized 2.754**  3.383** 
 (1.97)  (2.08) 
Post*MoreWorkload  1.172  
  (0.96)  
Post*LessWorkload  -0.104 -1.684 
  (-0.07) (-0.91) 
BrokerageSize 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.205*** 
 (3.37) (3.01) (3.41) 
Horizon -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (-2.63) (-2.61) (-2.62) 
    
Fixed Effects Turnover Turnover Turnover 
Clustered Standard Errors Turnover-Year Turnover-Year Turnover-Year 
Observations 22,931 22,931 22,931 









Table 10: Addressing potential autocorrelation of error terms 
The table reports the mean relative forecast accuracy for the sample before the turnover, after the turnover, and the change in the relative forecast accuracy as a 
result of the turnover. The relative forecast accuracy variable, FcstAccuracya,u is the mean of the relative forecast accuracy of each turnover, u, by each analyst, a, 
and is based on all forecasts made by each analyst a for all the firms that she cover in the year before the turnover (Pre) and in the two years following turnover 
(Post). FcstAccuracy is estimated as (│FE│/│ConsensusFE│-1)*100. FE is the analyst forecast error and ConsensusFE is the consensus forecast error at the time 
of the forecast, which excludes the “treatment” analyst. Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for brokerage house resources. Characteristic cutoff 
value represents the minimum change in the brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in the sample. Statistical 
significance is based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.  
 Brokerage house characteristic Change in characteristic N Pre Post Difference t-statistic 
(1) Accuracy All 1,273 4.587 4.591 0.004 (0.00) 
(2) >0% 579 2.541 4.393 1.852 (1.39) 
(3) >10%  358 1.046 4.701 3.655** (2.17) 
(4) >20% 200 -1.254 5.396 6.650*** (2.80) 
(5) <0% 694 6.215 4.748 -1.467 (-1.40) 
(6) <-10% 474 7.312 3.600 -3.712*** (-3.02) 
(7) <-20% 257 6.839 2.225 -4.614*** (-2.84) 
(8) Size All 1,273 4.587 4.591 0.004 (0.00) 
(9) >0% 682 3.643 6.321 2.678** (2.32) 
(10) >10% 251 -0.092 6.573 6.665*** (3.11) 
(11) >20% 109 -1.174 6.727 7.901** (2.13) 
(12) <0% 591 5.729 2.498 -3.231*** (-2.74) 
(13) <-10% 271 4.752 -0.362 -5.114*** (-2.88) 






Table 11: The change in market reaction to analyst forecasts following       
   turnover  
The table reports the results from estimating equation (2). Brokerage house characteristics represent the proxy for 
brokerage house resources. Characteristic cutoff value is set to 10%, and represents the minimum change in the 
brokerage house characteristic, in absolute value, that is required in order to be included in the sample. CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return in the 3-day window centered on the analyst forecast date. ForecastNews is the news 
component of the analyst forecast. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 for forecasts made following the “treatment” 
analyst’s switch to the new brokerage house, and 0 otherwise. MoveDown (MoveUp) is an indicator variable equal to 
1 for the “treatment” group of analysts (analysts switching brokerage house) who switch to less (more) resourceful 
brokerage houses. Statistical significance is based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** 
p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
Brokerage house characteristic Size Accuracy Difference 
Dependent Variable CAR CAR CAR 
       
Intercept 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (2.84) (4.04)  
MoveDown 0.002 0.002** 0.000 
 (1.34) (2.55) [0.324] 
MoveUp 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.29) (-1.14) [0.162] 
ForecastNews 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.001 
 (4.55) (6.06) [0.366] 
ForecastNews*MoveDown 0.008 -0.000 0.008* 
 (1.38) (-0.00) [0.095] 
ForecastNews*MoveUp -0.010** 0.001 -0.011** 
 (-2.41) (0.24) [0.035] 
PostTurnover 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.06) (-0.43) [0.387] 
PostTurnover*MoveDown -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.94) (-1.21) [0.463] 
PostTurnover*MoveUp 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.86) (0.88) [0.440] 
PostTurnover*ForecastNews -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-1.44) (-0.83) [0.223] 
PostTurnover*ForecastNews*MoveDown -0.013* -0.001 -0.014** 
 (-1.88) (-0.20) [0.039] 
PostTurnover*ForecastNews*MoveUp 0.014*** 0.004 -0.010* 
 (2.72) (0.84) [0.068] 
    
Fixed effects Firm Firm  
Clustered Standard Errors Analyst Analyst  
Observations 87,669 160,415  
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.013   
 
